People who use Linux, do you Enable Secure Boot and use the TPM (for Full Disk Encryption)? Or do you have those off?
Reason I'm asking is because there are some people claiming that the TPM is a backdoor or something. I wonder if people on Lemmy subscribe to that belief, or no?
This. Full disk encryption worked on Linux long before TPM, and works perfectly fine now still. TPM to me seems only additionally effective in a narrow range of "evil maid" attack scenarios where your (unencrypted, unsigned) bootloader is modified at rest, such as to steal your disk encryption key later. However A) I cannot afford to hire a maid, let alone one also skilled in editing Linux initramfs images and B) I don't see TPM evangelists check their keyboard USB cable for in-line hardware sniffers every single time they step away from their desk.
None. I just install os and use it without any encryption and such. It's more important for me to be able to access data on device failure than encrypt it.
"TPM is a backdoor" was something that got bandied around during the Vista era psrtially by people not understanding and partially (imo) to muddy the waters.
Secure Boot was maligned as at the time only MS were allowed to sign for it, so it was just an anti-linux locker. Later, after much haranguing, they backpedaled and allowed Canonical and Redhat to sign things, much much later, we could self sign.
TPM was also maligned around the same since MS (allegedly) had aspersions to only allow signed software which would be encrypted so that 'bad actors' (the users themselves) couldn't change 'protected' (any) executables. I think the closest we've ever seen of that is Windows S.
I don't, because I have better control over my disks. With TPM, the keys are stored within the chip itself, and I won't be able to unlock it if I boot into another OS (re-installing, dual boot, etc). With password, while inconvenient, I know that I can always unlock it, ans the chance of locking myself out is negligible.
TPM being a backdoor doesn't seem likely to me. Worst case scenario, transparent mode is just as bad as unencrypted disk. Most of the time, it adds extra security, though you are at the risk of locking yourself out.
Off. My system won't boot with it turned on. It just hangs at a black screen. From what I've been able to find out, it's due to unsigned video drivers.
I use heads firmware, which seals an otp key in the tpm to let you verify the integrity of the firmware, which then uses your gpg pubkey written into the firmware to verify the integrity of the boot partition.
An open, self-controlled equivalent to secure boot that relies on the tpm and your own gpg key, instead of on vendor secure boot signing keys. Very cool project!
I don't use either of those. If I were to use anything I'd use Linux's LUKS disk encryption, but as others have said, I'd rather error on the side of data recovery if I lose the keys.
Full disk encryption with LUKS. Don't really see much point in a TPM for booting my personal device, although it definitely has use cases and I don't know what's backdoorsy about it.
The TPM a backdoor, I guess it may be technically possible but it is highly unlikely. If you need a backdoor, the UEFI of a computer is a much more feasible option, especially with built in AMT firmware for remote management.
I use both. They work well and get out of my way, while adding security. Just make sure you use a distro that has those things working OOTB and you'll be fine.
My machines are old enough to not have that, so no. But, there are a lot of tpm implementations and I don't think they are backdoored in general. I know of some industry projects to use them in data centers. Otoh they often have vulnerabilities.
If I wanted a hardware token I'd use a dedicated one but that's just me.