Last week, I tried to register for a service and was really surprised by a password limit of 16 characters. Why on earth yould you impose such strict limits? Never heard of correct horse battery staple?
This is my biggest pet peeve. Password policies are largely mired in inaccurate conventional wisdom, even though we have good guidance docs from NIST on this.
Frustrating poor policy configs aside, this max length is a huge red flag, basically they are admitting that they store your password in plan text and aren’t hashing like they should be.
If a company tells you your password has a maximum length, they are untrustable with anything important.
Maximum password length should be at least 64 characters to allow passphrases (NIST SP800-63B). Note that certain implementations of hashing algorithms may cause long password denial of service.
The lemmy-UI limit is reasonably close and as everything is open source, we can verifiy that it does hash the password before storing it in the database.
It being open source helps because we can confirm it’s not being mishandled, but it’s generally arbitrary to enforce password max lengths beyond avoiding malicious bandwidth or compute usage in extreme cases.
If a company tells you your password has a maximumn length, they are untrustable with anything important.
I would add if they require a short "maximum length." There's no reason to allow someone to use the entirety of Moby Dick as their password, so a reasonable limit can be set. That's not 16 characters, but you probably don't need to accept more than 1024 anyway.
Of course, but if you're paying for network and processing costs you might as well cap it at something secure and reasonable. No sense in leaving that unbounded when there's no benefit over a lengthy cap and there are potentially drawbacks from someone seeing if they can use the entirety of Wikipedia as their password.
You can also hash it on the client-side, then the server-side network and processing costs are fixed because every password will be transmitted using same number of bytes
You still need to deal with that on the server. The client you build and provide could just truncate the input, but end users can pick their clients so the problem still remains.
The number of government websites that I’ve encountered with this “limitation.” Even more frustrating when it’s not described upfront in the parameters or just results in an uncaught error that reloads the page with no error message.
bcrypt has a maximum password length of 56 to 72 bytes and while it's not today's preferred algo for new stuff, it's still completely fine and widely used.
"If a company tells you your password has a maximum length..."
Uhhh no. Not at all. What so ever. Period. Many have a limit for technical reasons because hashing passwords expands their character count greatly. Many websites store their passwords in specific database columns that themselves have a limit that the hashing algorithm quickly expands passwords out to.
If you plan your DB schema with a column limit in mind for fast processing, some limits produce effectively shorter password limits than you might expect. EVERYONE has column limits at least to prevent attacks via huge passwords, so a limit on a password can be a good sign they're doing things correctly and aren't going to be DDOS'd via login calls that can easily crush CPUs of nonspecialized servers.
It doesn't matter the input size, it hashes down to the same length. It does increase the CPU time, but not the storage space. If the hashing is done on the client side (pre-transmission), then the server has no extra cost.
For example, the hash of a Linux ISO isn't 10 pages long. If you SHA-256 something, it always results in 256 bits of output.
On the other hand, base 64-ing something does get longer as the input grows.
Hashing is more about obscuring the password if the database gets compromised. I guess they could send 2^256 or 2^512 passwords guesses, but at that point you probably have bigger issues.
It's more about when a database gets leaked. They then don't even have to put in the effort of trying to match hashes to passwords. And that's what hashing a password protects against, when done correctly.
Just in case someone runs across this and doesn't notice the downvotes, the parent post is full of inaccuracies and bad assumptions. Don't base anything on it.
The hash isn't at all secure when you do that, but don't worry too much about it. GP's thinking about how things work is laughably bad and can't be buried in enough downvotes.
Though I'd say this isn't something you read directly, but rather understand by going through cryptographic security as a whole.
To keep it short, cryptographic hashes make a few guarantees. A single bit change in the input will cause a drastic change in the output. Due to the birthday problem, the length needs to be double the length of a block cipher key to provide equivalent security. And a few others. When you chop it down, you potentially undermine all the security guarantees that academics worked very hard to analyze.
Even a small change would require going to a lot of work to make sure you didn't break something. And when you've read up on cryptography in general and understand it, this tends to be an automatic reflex.
None of which really matters. GP's big assumption is that the hash size grows with input size, which is not true. Hash size stays fixed no matter the input.
also, if they think a strong password is only about types of characters. a dozen words from as many languages and 5+alphabets is just as good!
its to the point I don't bother remembering my passwords anymore, because this bullshit makes user-memorable-hard-to-machine-guess passwords impossible.