Edit: Wait I get it, if you bracket the statements differently (so that "do not have" applies to each one instead of all of them) you get (!A && !B && !C) instead of !(A && B && C). That seems super unintuitive and I can't believe the majority claimed that there's no ambiguity, when I feel like they've chosen the much less obvious interpretation.
Yeah, I feel like the article should have made reference to De Morgan's Law in order to explain the two interpretations. That's the one that says !(A && B && C) = !A || !B || !C, and !(A || B || C) = !A && !B && !C.
In English, there's no proper grouping operator, so it's basically it's a question of whether you distribute the NOT or the AND first over the list.
The Justices are saying that the ambiguity is completely resolved by the way the restrictions don't make sense if you interpret it the other way. But the underlying assumption there is that the laws of this country are logical, free from needless repetition and contradictory requirements, which is a TERRIBLE assumption. Our laws are at best written by a committee of people not very familiar with the subjects of those laws, and at worst written by scam artists who then paid to slip them under the radar and into the books. They're full of idiotic errors, deliberate sabotage, and absurdities. That's the whole reason for the thing about the lenient interpretation, and this decision will change that in a way that gives judges a whole lot of power to do more harm.
English is not a formal logical language and the word “and” works more distributively when doing negations in a way that formal logical formulas do not because they need to be manipulatable in a consistent manner.
Right! I feel like I’m going crazy because I don’t see how can you interpret it the other way!
lower courts were sharply divided on the vital question of whether “and” bundles the conditions—as in, you don’t have (A), don’t have (B), and don’t have (C)—which would mean a defendant who lacked any one of these conditions would be eligible for relief. The alternative reading, advocated by the Justice Department, holds that “and” really means “or”—that a defendant who met even one of the conditions would not be eligible for relief
The reporter seems to be getting this totally wrong. It’s like he is saying the exact opposite of what I understand. From my point of view:
If a defendant would be elegible for relief if he lacked any one of the conditions, that is actually interpreting that AND means OR.
If a defendant would be eligible for relief if he lacked all of the conditions, that is interpreting that AND means AND.
If a defendant would be elegible for relief if he lacked any one of the conditions, that is actually interpreting that AND means OR.
When you move the "not" to the inner terms, as you did in this reformulation, it flips the ANDs and ORs. That's expected. The original, with the "not" on the outside, has the and/or flip in the majority interpretation.
Note the crucial difference between writing this as an enumerated list, and writing it as a continuous sentence.
In the former case (used here) the "xyz is not" distributes such that each point on the list can be read as a complete sentence, giving your (correct) interpretation.
What seems to confuse a lot of people is that if you write "xyz is not A, B, and C", the "not" no longer distributes the same way, and (A, B, and C) is read as a single condition, giving the alternate (incorrect) interpretation.
A defendant is eligible if they do NOT have (A and B and C). In other words, having any of A, B or C will disqualify them.
The way you say that is using "or". "Do NOT have (A or B or C)". This interpretation makes expressing the "and" case in a concise form impossible. We already have linguistic rules to say what you and the majority think this says, and whatever poorly specified grammar Kagan uses to describe her weekend availability (I'd still say "I'm not free on Saturday or Sunday"), this is a legal document, meant to use precise language.
As you point out, there is precise language for the construct they ruled for. It wasn't used, while what was used is exactly the form you'd use for "and" meaning "and".
They could have clearly stated, A defendant is ineligible if they have any of the following, (or all of the following, or two of the following, or clearly state the matrix, A or B and C).
List
End of List.
Because in plain English that reads A or B and C. If you're going to use the word and anywhere in a list like that it needs to be at the end of every line you want included.
This is a very misleading article. A lot of other comments are already touching on the nuance of the argument here, but I just want to break it down the way I understand it.
(Before that, though, I just want to point out that this is a 6-3 decision, but it’s not the usual 6-3, since Kagan and Gorsuch flipped sides. I think that’s telling enough that this isn’t simply a party-lines interpretation.)
It’s not that SCOTUS argued that “and” means “or”, it’s that when you have a statement “a person is eligible if not (a), (b), and (c)”, there is ambiguity in the order of operations between “not” and “and”. The statement could either mean
(1) E = !(A and B and C)
or
(2) E = (!A) and (!B) and (!C)
Demorgan’s law says we can rewrite (1) and (2) as
(1) !E = A and B and C
(2) !E = A or B or C
The court went with interpretation (2), not because one is more “correct” than the other. It seems like (2) was chosen because of the two “statutory difficulties” listed in the syllabus of Pulsifer v. United States.
(1) Pulsifer's reading would render Subparagraph A superfluous because a defendant who has a three-point offense under Subpara-graph B and a two-point offense under Subparagraph C will always have more than four criminal-history points under Subparagraph A. That reading leaves Subparagraph A with no work to do: removing it from the statute would make the exact same people eligible (and inel-igible) for relief. That kind of superfluity, in and of itself, refutes Pul-sifer's reading. When a statutory construction "render[s] an entire subparagraph meaningless," this Court has noted, the canon against surplusage applies with special force. National Assn. of Mfrs. v. Department of Defense, 583 U.S. 109, 128. That is particularly true when, as here, the subparagraph is so evidently designed to serve a concrete function. Pp. 15-20.
(2) Pulsifer's reading would also create a second problem related to Paragraph (f)(1)'s gatekeeping function. The Guidelines presume that defendants with worse criminal records exhibiting recidivism, lengthy sentences, and violence deserve greater punishment. Under the Government's reading, Paragraph (f)(1) sorts defendants accordingly. When the defendant has committed multiple non-minor of-fenses, he cannot get relief (Subparagraph A). And so too when he has committed even a single serious offense punished with a lengthy prison sentence (Subparagraph B) or one involving violence (Subpara-graph C). Pulsifer's reading, by contrast, would allow safety-valve relief to defendants with more serious records while barring relief to defendants with less serious ones. A defendant with a three-point offense and a two-point violent offense would be denied relief. But a defendant with multiple three-point violent offenses could get relief simply because he happens not to have a two-point violent offense.
Contrary to Pulsifer's view, that anomalous result cannot be ignored on the ground that a sentencing judge retains discretion to impose a lengthy sentence. If Congress thought it could always rely on sentencing discretion, it would not have created a criminal-history requirement in the first instance. Instead, it specified a requirement that allows such discretion to operate only if a defendant's record does not reach a certain level of seriousness. Pulsifer's construction of Paragraph (f)(1) makes a hash of that gatekeeping function. Pp. 20-23.
In summary, this is a ruling that could have gone either way, and the side the court chose isn’t totally ridiculous.
It is the side of giving fewer people just the eligibility for relief, which is pretty shitty. But if the court was stooping to an argument as bad as the headline made it out to be, IMO we’d have MUCH bigger problems.
That’s a reasonable interpretation of my simplified statement “a person is eligible if not (a), (b), and (c)”, but I purposely kept my simplification all on 1 line to bring down the line count, which was futile in the end anyway :)
A closer simplification to the exact text is:
“A person is eligible if not:
(a);
(b); and
(c)”
With formatting I think it’s fair to say “not” should apply to all 3 bullet points, but it’s unclear whether it applies before or after “and-ing” the 3 together.
Edit: formatting. Idk if it’s just my lemmy client or if it’s markdown constraints, but if I only put 1 “newline” between successive statements then the newline is ignored and my entire point of putting different things on different lines making a difference is completely sabotaged :)
This is what happens when you write a constitution with ambiguous language. People arguing about semantics rather than implementing solutions. Fuck, they even decided that the "Executive Office of the President of the United States" isn't actually an "office" even though it literally has "Office" in its title.
To be fair to Clinton he was clarifying on the timeframe intended by the statement because tense matters, e.g. “is, but at the time in question or is, as of right now” because English can definitely be ambiguous sometimes
So I looked it up, and the law appears to be worded like this:
‘‘(1) the defendant does not have—
‘‘(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;
‘‘(B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and
‘‘(C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;’’
So let's simplify this into English. Because the header says that "The defendant does not have" and then has subsections, we will append that idea to the start of each subsection.
The defendant doesn't have more than four crime points
and
The defendant doesn't have a 3 point offense
and
The defendant doesn't have a violent 2 point offense.
Simplifying it down like this makes it seem like the way it is written is the more strict way the supreme court decided on. It sounds like the supreme court is correct in this case, but they don't know why they're correct, since their reason is all wrong.
While there's no 'and' after '(A)', it appears that's the standard format for a list like this. Every list of x, y, and z in this bill is written in the same way. It seems like it's supposed to be written like you would a list you give in English. There's a list of conditions under which a prisoner can be transferred to a prison closer to their home when near release time, and the conditions are listed in the same exact way.
‘‘(2) TRANSFER TO INSTITUTION CLOSER TO RELEASE RESIDENCE.—A prisoner who is successfully participating in an evidence-based recidivism reduction program shall be considered by the Bureau of Prisons for placement in a facility closer to the prisoner’s release residence upon request from the prisoner and subject to—
‘‘(A) bed availability at the transfer facility;
‘‘(B) the prisoner’s security designation; and
‘‘(C) the recommendation from the warden of the prison at which the prisoner is incarcerated at the time of making the request.
There's no way they will allow you to transfer to a prison that has no space for you, so long as you can fulfill both B and C, it'd be physically impossible! It's clear they intend for you to meet all 3 requirements, just like in the segment being discussed by the supreme court in the article. There's also like a seven item list of responsibilities the Attorney General has in the bill too, formatted with the same (A); (B); (C); ... (G); and (H) format. And there's no way they let the dude just pick which task from the list he's responsible for. Once you become familiar with the bill's format, it's extremely clear how this is supposed to work.
I feel like that specific issue is pretty cut and dry, but that's just me.
This harkens back to Bill Clinton's ridiculous impeachment (looking at you, Bill Barr, Ken Starr, George Conway) and his ridiculous defense, "It depends on what the meaning of 'is' is," in which a very young and naïve woman was the sacrificial lamb.
Oddly, no discussion about any of the debate writers and legislature had about this bill. As a lay person, I can kind of see both sides, would prefer the defendants win, but also feel like the INTENT of this recent law would be easy to find. If the intent was to free loads of people, or only just a few relatively innocent ones..... I guess originalism only matters when people have been dead for hundreds of years.