Not really.
I’m calling it what it actually was: a single-point-of-failure event that exposed how dependent the modern web is on one company’s infrastructure.
Whether we call it an “outage,” “incident,” or “hiccup” doesn’t change the fact that thousands of unrelated services broke simply because one upstream provider had a bad moment.
If a small naming disruption can cascade through half the internet, the terminology isn’t the issue.
The architecture is.
Not exactly.
Cloudflare’s DNS resolver responded, but the outage still broke the availability path for huge portions of the web.
When a single provider sits in front of:
• DNS resolution
• CDN routing
• TLS termination
• DDoS filtering
…then even if their DNS cluster survives, the dependency chain behind it doesn’t.
The problem isn’t “Cloudflare DNS failed.”
The problem is “the modern web is built in a way where one company having a bad minute takes thousands of unrelated sites down.”
Not really. I’m calling it what it actually was: a single-point-of-failure event that exposed how dependent the modern web is on one company’s infrastructure.
Whether we call it an “outage,” “incident,” or “hiccup” doesn’t change the fact that thousands of unrelated services broke simply because one upstream provider had a bad moment.
If a small naming disruption can cascade through half the internet, the terminology isn’t the issue. The architecture is.