VPN company Mullvad reminds users it will no longer use OpenVPN
VPN company Mullvad reminds users it will no longer use OpenVPN

Reminder that OpenVPN is being removed | Mullvad VPN

VPN company Mullvad reminds users it will no longer use OpenVPN
Reminder that OpenVPN is being removed | Mullvad VPN
WG was always so much better anyway.
Well it was written to replace open VPN right? So that makes sense
Not sure about that. I set up a wg vpn server on a system which then became unresponsive whenever wg was fully saturating the network. Turns out there is apparently no way to throttle or prioritize a wg server, the only way I could think of would be to dedicate a vm to solely the wg vpn and throttle that vm in its networking.
I instead switched to openvpn which can simply be throttled via a line in its configuration.
Besides that missing feature, openvpn also doesn't require figuring out the right iptables commands to verbatim paste into its config as startup and shutdown commands. Setting it up was way easier than wg (though openvpn too wasn't exactly user-friendly).
WG to me seems too clunky and unfinished for more mainstream usage, though I am sure it wouldn't be an issue for a large commercial user like mullvad that will have no issue with all that.
Regarding link saturation - have you tried tc/wondershaper? https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/28198/how-to-limit-network-bandwidth#28203
Iptables commands - that was needed at the very launch of wg, I've not had to deal with it for some time now.
Personal/commercial use - I'm on a completely opposite side. It's perfect for personal use, but its lack of dhcp support makes me question its capability in a commercial setting. Many providers offer it, so clearly that's not an insurmountable task, but I'm still curious how they sort out their backend.
Urgh, I don't really have time to do this migration but guess I'm planning it in anyway.
Past me was a lazy bum. But I'm confident that future me is all over this. Time for a nap.
Damn you sir, you didn't need to call me out with that last paragraph.
No, I know it wasn't my shoe, but look at how well it fits!
I only have one problem with this. When they say wireguard being crypto opinionated is a good thing. I am weary to agree with that statement entirely.
While it is good for stability (only one stack to support and get right, and to be secure and efficient) I do wonder about overall and future security. Saying "You must use this specific cipher suite because we think it's the best" is a bit of a dangerous road to take.
I say this just because Curve 25519 is considered a very secure elliptic curve, to the best of my very limited knowledge on this subject. But we had a certain dual elliptic curve pseudo random number generator was pushed as "best practice" (NIST backed) some time ago, which didn't turn out so well, even omitting possible conspiracy scenarios, it had known weaknesses even before it was recommended. [1]
Since then I've generally not been a huge fan of being given one option as "the right way" when it comes to cryptography. Even if it is the "best" it gives one target to try to find a weakness in, rather than many.
I say all this as a wireguard user, it's a great, fast and reliable VPN. I just have concerns when the choice of using other algorithms and especially putting my own chosen chain together is taken away. Because it puts the exact same target to break on every one of us, rather than having to work out how to break multiple methods and algorithms and multiple combinations.
I think the idea behind opinionated cryptography is not only the idea of "We think this is the best, so you have to use it", but most importantly it removes all requirements of the protocol supporting cipher negotiation. This makes the protocol much simpler, easier to audit and as a result more secure. And if the cryptography in the protocol ever shows a weakness, then Wireguard v2 needs to be released as a breaking change. See all the SSL/TLS versions
Yep. I entirely agree about the good points. I am just always weary about removing options like this, regardless of intention.
I'd be fine if for example I'm running my own wireguard implementation, I could choose the suite to use, not negotiate anything and ensure my client has the same configuration.
I'd probably not use it, but I like the option, and knowing that anyone that wants to try to break this now also needs to guess what options I'm running.
Even if it is the "best" it gives one target to try to find a weakness in, rather than many.
It sounds as if you're falling prey to the allure of security through obscurity.
I'd like to remind you of Kerckhoff's Principle.
a cryptosystem should be secure, even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge
What this is saying is that in a secure cryptosystem all you need to secure is the key.
Curve 25519 is, for the time being, considered a secure cryptosystem. It's likely that in the future it will become obsolete, but we're not there yet. When we get there WG will port to a new cipher that is more secure.
Even if you set your configs to not negotiate, just the fact that the stack COULD negotiate opens you up to downgrade attacks. Also, anybody trying to connect would get some kind of hello/response traffic that would broadcast your (non negotiable) configs, so what do you gain from being able to choose, except the ability to make mistakes?
Well, I did think the "security through obscurity" line would come up. But that's really something that should be reserved for people making their own "triple XOR" crypto implementations closed source and hoping that protects them.
The "obscurity" if it's the term we want to use here in my use case isn't hiding using closed source to provide a perception of security. It's just giving a choice of crypto, but not adding to the protocol with negotiation.
My thinking is this, and we'll look at say ssh. We can choose between multiple key types and lengths for that. Now let's say for example ed25519 is compromised (in real terms I think the only likely compromise for any of the ssh key based auth options would be deriving a private key from the public key, so the "scanning" I talk about is a fantasy. But I'm going with it!). For ssh, there will for sure be bots hunting the internet for vulnerable ssh servers very soon after. Automating the process of getting in, installing whatever nefarious tools they want and moving on. But, crucially they will only get those that have used ed25519 for their auth key login. However they might well get every single wireguard vpn.
I'm really just advocating for the same option really. The option to not use the same as everyone else. With no reduction in security for anyone else and no need to negotiate, the onus would entirely be on the operator to ensure the same stack is configured on client and server. Of course with the understanding that using any other stack is at your own risk. E.g. "triple XOR" security might not be the best, for example :P
Oh and as I said, I doubt I would use it. I use wireguard as it is, I like wireguard as it is. But, I feel like having options is not a bad thing, provided the default is the "best" option currently known.
A bit annoying for all the things that don't support openvpn, like old Synology NAS devices.
Bummer. For whatever reason I always get much better speeds on openvpn servers.
That's not something you hear very often.
Only the opposite has ever happened for me.
Oh I know it's odd. I think it must be something with my router or windows configuration, but it's very noticeably different between the two.
Good! That shit needs to be phased out.
This post makes it look like there's something serious ly wrong with openvpn, but it's just them not wanting to deal with it and deprecating it.
Oh well, guess Ill put a note not to use them. My country blocks VPN protocols and wg specifically, so for my usecase I need as many protocols supported as possible, preferrably mimicking other innocuous protocols.