ProtonMail often touts its Swiss jurisdiction and privacy guarantees, but at the same time, it is complying with a record number of data request orders going through the Swiss legal system. ProtonMail is one of the most popular secure email services in the world, having launched in 2014 via a crowdf...
Proton are very transparent about what data is and isn’t stored, how data is protected and what (very limited) data may be available in the event of a legal warrant - going through all the proper channels.
Complying with legal warrants doesnt make the service insecure or not private. It makes it a legal and legitimate company.
It shouldn’t really be a surprise to any of it’s users.
Some people have the idea that a private business is going to break the law or defy their governments requests for them. That’s completely deluded, nobody would ever open willingly expose themself to that kind of risk. No organization is going to let themselves go on trial for $15/month. It seems we have a binary idea of privacy, when the reality is much more complex.
Remember that time I think it was Signal got a warrant for all data they had on a user and literally all the data they had was account name, creation date, and last login date? That was funny.
Never forget every email that leaves Protonmail to other email providors are not anymore secure or encrypted as using gmail or others.
Second no one can certify that incoming emails and meta-data can't be read and recorded to a ghost mailbox before getting encrypted. you have no control on what happens on their servers
It's really difficult if not impossible to be private with services you can't trust... suppose you were to not trust Tor. How can you prove it to be private if you can't trust anything they say or share? I think it's almost impossible, isn't it?
You're going to have to put trust somewhere if you want to be private, whether it's your device's hardware, software, ISP or other...
I don't think that Tor relies entirely on trust. it rather relies on the probability that there needs to be at least half of entry and exit nodes compromised for a attacker to be able to deanonymize users trying to access the clearnet. the hidden network is even harder to deanonymize as there are more than 6 hops in the path. and all nodes participating in the network are visible.
proton on the other hand can do what ever they please on their servers and can never get caught with it.