Web3 developer Brian Guan lost $40,000 after accidentally making his wallet keys public on GitHub.
Web3 developer Brian Guan lost $40,000 after accidentally posting his wallet's secret keys publicly on GitHub, with the funds being drained in just two minutes.
The crypto community's reactions were mixed, with some offering support and others mocking Guan's previous comments about developers using AI tools like ChatGPT for coding.
This incident highlights ongoing debates about security practices and the role of AI in software development within the crypto community.
One of the first things you should do in a repo is add a .gitignore file and make sure there are rules to ignore things like *secret* or *private* etc. Also, I pretty much never use git add . because I don't like the laziness of it and EVERY TIME one of my coworkers checked in secrets they were using that command.
Even though that's a good extra precaution, per person config data, such as keys, should be stored outside of the repo, eg. in the parent directory or better in the users home dir. There is zero reason to have it in the repo. Even if you use a VM/containers, you can add the config in an extra mount/share.
What's the general consensus on storing encrypted data in the repo with the keys outside? I see people recommend that but I'm too paranoid and my secrets are very small in size so it hasn't been necessary.
the format of the encrypted file can give the attackers an advantage. if your code reads the decrypted file, the attacker can guess the first line is a comment or the name of a setting. a savvy person can combine that with the algorithm to perform a "known plaintext attack", for example by generating a number of possible passwords that would lead to files starting like that.
That's not quite the definition of known plaintext attack (cryptography nerd here), that's bruteforce with a "crib" to use older terminology (known patterns which allows you to test candidate keys).
A known plaintext attack is defined as an attack on the algorithm to extract the key faster than bruteforce with analytical attacks.
I see some of that in my job. We put encrypted data in settings files, and the keys for decryption are provided on the VMs where we deploy. The developers never actually see the keys.
I suppose it's as secure as the process for managing the production VMs, assuming the encryption isn't just md5!
Instead of just adding whole changed files, it starts an interactive mode where it shows every hunk of diffs one by one, and asks you to input yes or no for each change. Very helpful for doing your own mini code review or sanity check before you even commit.
I never understood why everyone uses it as a ignore list. In my own and work repositories I always exclude everything by default and re-add stuff explicitly. I have had enough random crap checked in in the past by coworkers. Granted, the whole source folder is fully included but that has never been a problem.
Better yet you can configure gitignore globally for git. I do this mostly to avoid polluting repo ignore files with my editor specific junk but *.key and similar can help prevent accidents.
For personal projects that's definitely a good idea. For team projects I like to keep that stuff in the project still so the "experience" of working in the project is mostly consistent.
I started using git-secret 2 years ago. It's nice for making secrets part of the repo, while not being readable by anyone that isn't explicitely allowed to do so (using GPG).
Better yet you can configure gitignore globally for git.
I think you really need the project specific gitignore as well, to make sure any other contributor that joins by default has the same protections in place.
Does Microsoft's GitHub offer any pre-receive hook configuration to reject commits pushed that contain private keys? Surely that would be a better feature to opt all users into rather than Windows Copilot.
The docs say they can reject if you enable push protection, which is also available for private repos, just as a paid feature. It's free for public, but still needs to be enabled.
They have something called advanced security that can scan for things like secrets. It works on PRs though, so not very helpful if you have a public repo.