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Novel attack against virtually all VPN apps neuters their entire purpose

arstechnica.com Novel attack against virtually all VPN apps neuters their entire purpose

TunnelVision vulnerability has existed since 2002 and may already be known to attackers.

Novel attack against virtually all VPN apps neuters their entire purpose
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  • That's why half decent VPN apps also add firewall rules to prevent leakage. Although nothing can beat Linux and shoving the real interface in a namespace so it's plainly not available to anything except the VPN process.

    • Yes, I don't agree with the no way to mitigate statement.

      I suspect on windows the only real defence is something like.

      • Check if the network has suspicious multiple routes setup from the DHCP
      • If so, either use the IP/Mask/Gateway with manual IP config (to not receive the CIDR routes) or steer clear of an at best questionable network entirely.
      • Maybe use the windows firewall to block all traffic outbound EXCEPT from the firewall program (with perhaps exceptions for local networks as per below linux example). For whatever reason the windows firewall doesn't seem to have a way to specify an interface. But you can specify a program.

      I did look for some way to control Window's handling of DHCP options. But it seems there isn't anything obvious to limit this otherwise. I do not know if the windows firewall has this kind of fine-grained control with its own fire

      For linux, I used to have my own blackout firewall rules. That only allowed the specific LAN range (for mobile use you could include all RFC1918 ranges) and the specific VPN IP out of the internet facing interface. Only the VPN interface could otherwise access the internet.

120 comments